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THEAPPOINTMENT-BOOK PROBLEM ANDCOMMITMENT.
WITHAPPLICATIONS TO REFEREEING ANDMEDICINE
ABSTRACT
Markets that involve customers waiting for services or goods in
queues whose length they cannot observe are studied. In these markets
suppliers truncate queues that become so long that they jeopardize the
supplier's future relations with the customer. The length of the
queue and the probability of truncation increase with the quality of
the supplier, and this implicitly defines the price that customers are
willing to pay for quality. Queue-jumping or nontruncation can occur
if monetary payments are made or if nonmonetary specific commitments
exist between a customer and a supplier. The predictions apply to any
activity where the queue is unobservable and transactions costs make
contracts or spot pricing uneconomic.
The theory is examined on a random sample of refereeing requests
by seven economics journals. Quality, measured by experience and
citations to the referee's work, lengthens the queue and increases the
probability of truncation. Monetary bribes affect queue discipline in
the expected way; and specific commitments, measured by past
publication in the journal and location at the editor's institution,
greatly affect the truncation rate, but have no impact on the rate of
servicing the queue. The implications for truncation are also
examined on a set of data describing doctors' willingness to accept
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and NBERWho more busy than he that hath least to do? (Thomas
Draxe, 1633)
It's (Toots Shor's restaurant] so busy that nobody goes
there any more. (Attributed to Yogi Berra)
I. Introduction and Motivation
A wide variety of economic activity consists of services
offered by individuals or firms who are unable to ration completely
using prices.In each case the supplier is approached by a
customer demanding the service at a fixed price that may be below
that which clears the spot market. The purpose of the analysis
here is to examine the incentives facing suppliers, to infer how
differences in their characteristics affect how they treat demand,
and to study how their relations to their customers affect their
behavior.
There has been some study of markets where non—price rationing
of goods by the value of customers' waiting time takes place.
Deacon and Sonstelie (1985) analyzed how customers choose whether
to queue to purchase low—priced gasoline; Lindsay and Feigenbaum
(1984) studied the case of the British National Health Service, and
Nichols et al (1971) examined the demand for publicly—provided
services.In those cases and numerous others, including waiting
for bank tellers, obtaining a table at a crowded restaurant, etc.,
the market allocates the scarce good or service partly along the
dimension of the value of the time of actual and potential
consumers. Consumers choose whether or not to enter the queue by
comparing their desire for the service to its observable full price
that includes its time cost.
1In a variety of other markets that have not been studied the
nature of the available information prevents the customer from
estimating the time cost of the service. This gives suppliers the
ability to allocate places in the queue for the service. Moreover,
it offers them a second margin of choice, whether to deny customers
access to the queue, in addition to the choice about the rate of
service that they have when the customer can observe the time cost.
This phenomenon, the appointment—book problem, characterizes
behavior in a fairly broad range of markets. Physicians in private
practice ration their services to potential new customers by
imposing long waits for health examinations. They may also
truncate the queue by having callers informed that they are not
accepting new patients. Senior attorneys perform work for some new
clients, but because their hourly billing rates are hard to change,
the market cannot ration their scarce time fully. The time to
completion of a fairly routine legal transaction by a senior
attorney may be much greater than by a junior lawyer. The senior
attorney may also assign the task to a junior colleague or refer
the client elsewhere.
Markets outside professional services also provide examples of
waiting and truncation,Very high-quality hair-dressers and
barbers schedule appointments with longer lead times than their
less well—known fellows. Airlines maintain no—charge (to the
caller) telephone lines for making inquiries about reservations or
flights: The inquiry may be served immediately; the caller may be
put on hold and told to wait for the next available agent; or a
2busy signal may be heard.1 This last response is equivalent to
truncation from the queue.
The economic questions of interest in this phenomenon are what
determine differences among suppliers in the length of the queue
they maintain and the rate at which they truncate the queue. To
what extent does suppliers' specific commitment to their customers
affect which ones are allowed into the queue? To what extent does
it determine the waiting time?How are these affected by the
inherent quality of the supplier?
I focus here on what are in some sense small questions. The
larger questions ——-whysuppliers fail to ration fully by price,
and why, given that failure, they ever cut off the queue ———are
not answered. Why not let anyone who wishes remain in the queue,
thus reducing the fraction of periods when the queue is empty, and
thus when the service is not utilized? This may reflect a long-run
profit—maximizing desire to avoid antagonizing current or potential
clients; or it may be explained by suppliers' commitment to their
profession/skill •2
In the next Section I examine the behavior of a utility—
maximizing supplier of services who has two margins of choice by
which to affect the queue. Of particular interest is the
derivation of the effects of supplier's quality on the expected
length of the queue (or waiting time) and the fraction of customers
1.Frances Hamermesh and Paul Chen provided some of these
examples.
2.This is the kind of altruistic commitment discussed in
Frank (1988).denied service. Section III describes a new set of data, on the
behavior of referees for a group of economics journals, that was
collected especially for this project.Section IV examines how
well those data are described by the predictions of the
appointment—book model, and Section V discusses queue—jumping and
examines the implicit market for quality. Section VI studies the
truncation issue on yet another set of data collected for this
study, this one describing physicians in a pre-paid health plan.
The conclusion indicates some extensions and considers the larger
question of why truncation arises.
IX. The Appointment-Book Model of Rationing
Assume the supplier's time is divided between providing the
service and all other activities. Each time period has T units,
and the supplier's expected utility is described by the function:
(1) U =U(T—, ),
whereis the average number of units in the time period devoted
to providing the service, and >0,U <Iassume throughout
this Section that each customer requires the same amount of time
from the supplier. Clearly, a more general model could expand this
to make the quality of service, measured by the amount of time
devoted to a customer, subject to choice. With this simple utility
3. The model is couched in terms of utility instead of profit
maximization. This seems more consistent with the importance of
time use and the nature of many of the examples of professional
services that motivate the paper.Nonetheless, if one assumes
suppliers are price-takers, the model can be revised mutatis
mutandis to yield similar results based on profit maximization so
long as there is a constraint on the supplier's capacity to serve
clients.function the supplier just sets the marginal rate of substitution
between the two uses of time equal to one.
The rate of arrival of customers is exponential and is
described by the parainter A. The rate depends on the quality of
the supplier, Z, so that:
(2) A =A(Z),A >0
and by assumption A < Inthis simplest model A has no effect
on the expected service rate, since the latter is chosen to
maximize (1). Without any denial of entry to the queue, L*, the
average waiting time in the queue, is:
L*A(z)/( —A(z)).
Even a very simple model generates the prediction that the average
waiting time is an increasing function of quality.
A model with exogenous general commitment requires that all
suppliers have (the same) commitment to deny entry into the queue
to those customers whom they cannot expect to serve in less than t
time periods. With this cut—off we obtain the customer's average
waiting time:
(3) L =a5texp(—at)dt/[l—exp(—at')],
and the supplier's mean rate of refusal:
(4)p =exp(_at*),
4. Implicit in (2) is the assumption that all suppliers are
constrained to charge the same (below—market) price.The model
could be modified to allow price to be correlated with Z, so long
as the negative effect of Z on A through price is less than its
direct positive effect.
5where a =[j - A)/i.Since.tdoesnot change with changes in A,
while higher Z increases A (though not by enough so that it exceeds
),itfollows immediately that higher—quality suppliers have
higher L and p.
What if the degree of general commitment is subject to
suppliers' choice, and:
(1') U =U(T-, , t),
with U3 <0to capture the notion that suppliers utility or
profits decrease with the maximum time a customer waits in the
queue?6Together with the arrival rate A(Z), this assumption
generates an optimizing set of values of j,t,L and p.
Specifying general commitment in (1'), though, makes the optimizing
and t, and the resulting L* and p* functions of Z. Without any
a priori restrictions one cannot guarantee that higher Z continues
to increase L* and p, as in the model with t exogenous and the
resulting independence offrom the arrival rate. The effects of
Z on L and p, though, will always be in the same direction, given
the assumptions. If, as seems reasonable, the effects of higher Z
on and t are sufficiently smaller than the direct positive
effect on p, we will continue to observe in the steady state that
higher—quality suppliers exhibit longer waiting times and higher
refusal rates.
5. The derivations are based on Xarlin and Taylor (1975).
6.(1') could be written as a function of L instead of t
with the same resulting ambiguous conclusions.One might assume further that suppliers' commitment means that
their utility is affected differently by changes in L and p that
result from altering t. If so, the standard model of exponential
arrival rates and fixed service times no longer applies. No formal
steady—state queuing result is possible. The response depends on
the extent of asymmetry in suppliers' attitudes about refusal and
waiting time.
I have said nothing thus far about specific commitment ———who
gets served. The commitment not to make customers wait too long
has been general.Yet with the ability to ration customers,
suppliers can discriminate in favor of those whose characteristics
they find more desirable. For a given level of quality, if
specific commitment exists we should find that prior supplier—
customer ties will reduce the customer's waiting time and
probability of denial of entry to the queue.7The problem is
similar to that noted by Wilson (1989) in the demand for electric
power, except that here the commitment is not forged by explicitly
priced contracts, but instead by nonpriced arrangements.
This discussion does not allow for the possibility that
consumers might circumvent the below—market price and/or specific
commitment by bribing the supplier to enter a closed queue or to
jump position in an existing queue. It is difficult to draw many
inferences about queue—jumping.For a fixed bribe, though, we
should expect that the amount of queue—jumping that a supplier
7. A simple example is airlines' practice of offering
preferred (frequent) customers special toll—free numbers for
booking tickets or obtaining flight information.
7allows will be the minimum consistent with obtaining the bribe.
Larger bribes will generate larger jumps ahead in the queue and
larger drops in the refusal rate. For a smaller bribe one should
expect smaller changes.
I have assumed that the arrival rate is independent of L* and
p and depends only on the supplier's quality. What if, though,
customers recognize that higher—quality suppliers will generally
have longer queues and higher truncation rates?The utility—
maximizing supplier then chooses and t taking account of
customers' reactions.In the steady state this generates an
equilibrium in which differences in L and p reflect both
suppliers' and customers' behavior and imply a market price of
quality. The gradients of L* and p with respect to quality will
be flatter than they would be if customers did not account for
suppliers' responses to differential arrival rates.
III. Refereeing as an Appointment-Book Problem
The main specific empirical example that I present is that of
refereeing scholarly papers for academic journals (in economics)
This activity clearly fits the appointment—book problem described
above. In most cases suppliers are not paid for their services, so
that any rationing of their time must be done by non—price methods.
Customers (journal editors) cannot observe the length of referees'
queues. The referees can be viewed as members of a community (of
professional economists), so that there may be general commitment
to the community (to the profession itself). The degree of
specific commitment may vary depending on which journal requeststhe referee's services. Finally, there are objective measures of
quality among professional economists that lend themselves to
representing Z.
There has been a huge amount of research by sociologists, and
more recently by economists, on the refereeing process. Most of
that study has been of the fairness and quality of the reviews.
Studies involving correlations between referees' opinions on the
same article or proposal and the re—refereeing of articles and
proposals (Cole et al, 1978; Peters and Ceci, 1982) have been
designed to determine whether the refereeing process can
distinguish quality among submissions.Blank (1991) and many
earlier studies (e.g., Crane, 1967) have examined whether
refereeing outcomes differ between single— and double—blind trials;
and Laband (1990) studied the productivity of refereeing in terms
of subsequent citations to the published article.
There has been very little study of the refereeing activity
itself. Evidence from physics (Zuckerman and Merton, 1971)
indicates that referees tend to be of higher quality on average
than the authors whose papers they read; but no research has been
conductedinto the allocation of time by referees. In addition to
examining a novel and fairly broad area of economic behavior, the
evidence here and in the next two Sections thus fills a gap in the
study of the organization of scholarly publishing.
There are no secondary data on referees' time use. I
therefore asked editors of eleven journals to participate in the
following exercise. Based on a tabulation sheet (Appendix Table
9Al), the editorial office was to keep a record of a very few
characteristics of referee reports resulting from the next fifty
requests on initial submissions of articles that were sent out.
The information allows me to determine L for each refereeing
request i, and whether t ￿ t for the particular request.8 The
length of the paper, a measure of heterogeneity among the referee's
"customers," was also obtained, as was the referee's name.
Seven editors agreed to participate in the project, which
began in November 1989. Their journals include four that publish
articles in a variety of subspecialties (general journals, Gl
through G4), and three that publish in only one subspecialty each
(specialized journals, Si through S3).I rank them in descending
order according to the rate at which articles in them are cited.9
By November 1990 all seven journals had returned the recording
forms. Of the 350 possible data points, 343 were usable: On three
the editor did not seek a report; one paper was withdrawn by its
author; one form was blank; and on one no page—length was recorded.
For one other request I was unable to construct one of the crucial
variables in the vector Z.Given the nature of the sampling
procedure and the nearly Complete sample, the data set is a random
sample of refereeing at these seven journals.
8. was calculated as the actual number of days elapsed
from the time the manuscript left the editorial office to the time
it was received back, minus seven days if the Christmas—New Year's
holiday intervened.
9. From Leibowitz and Palmer (1984).I have designated the
one journal that was too new to be rated in that study as Si, based
on its immediate success in attracting attention from the
profession generally.
10The editorial records were linked to a variety of indicators
that might describe referees' quality. These included X, years of
experience since the Ph.D., based in most cases on self—reported
information in the American Economic Association Membership
Directory. 1989.10 This standard measure of productivity should
proxy the same thing among these professionals. The names were
also linked to the Social Science Citation Index for 1989, and each
referee's citations by other scholars in 1989 were included in the
data set.This measure of quality seems to be a more important
determinant of one outcome of quality differences among economists
dispersion in salaries -——thaneither counts of publications
or the status of the outlets of one's research (Hameronesh et al,
1982).The density of citations is highly skewed; thus in
subsequent discussion I report this measure in dummy—variable form,
with CITS1O—49 equalling one if the referee was cited 10 through 49
times in 1989 (was well—cited), and CITSSO equalling one if he or
she received 50 or more citations (was heavily-cited). A final
possible set of proxies for Z is a vector of dummy variables
indicating the referee's employment. It includes: Top 20, if the
referee's school was rated among the twenty best graduate economics
departments in Boddy (1982); Cartel, if the school is included
among the roughly one hundred that exchange information on salaries
and employment; and Other academic, if not. (The excluded category
is non—academic employment.)
10. For those individuals not listed in the Directory,
indexes of other organizations were consulted or the editors were
telephoned to supply the information.
11The commitment measures were constructed to reflect the
referee's ties to the particular journal or to the profession
generally. The former, which can be viewed as measuring specific
commitment, include whether the author is at the same school as the
journal's editor, and whether he or she published in that journal
during the quinquennium 1986—1990. Measures describing possible
differences in general commitment to the profession (as represented
by these American scholarly journals) are the referee's sex and
whether or not the referee is located in North America.
Statistics describing the raw data and the constructed
variables are presented in Table 1 for each of three categories of
referees: Those who the job (for whom t <t*)those who refuse
to referee (for whom t1 ￿ t*), and those who "j" the paper.
Seventy-eight percent of those asked to referee comply.Among
"refusers" (seventeen percent of the sample) the mean time to
refusal is only 23 days (with a median of 17 days, and a seventy-
fifth percentile of 27 days), implying that truncation from the
queue occurs shortly after entry. The remaining five percent of
the sample who are "losers" pose some small difficulty for
interpreting the results. This group includes only those from whom
the editor requested the paper back or, in some of the seventeen
cases, who had not refereed the paper in at least eight months at
the time therecordingsheets were returned from the editorial off ices.1
11.Whether the paper should be viewed as having been
truncated from a very long queue that would eventually have been
served, or as in a Kafkaesque predicament without possibility of
escape, is unclear. The relatively small proportion of the sample
that is in this category means that it does not affect most of the
12Many of the results on the determinants of can be seen from
the differences among the means in Table 1.Doers have less
experience than refusers (though more than losers) ;theyare less
likely to be well- or heavily-cited than the other groups, and are
less likely to be employed at the top 20 schools. Doers are more
likely to be employed by the school where the journal's editor
works and much more likely to have published in the journal than
refusers or losers.Also, women are less likely to refuse to
referee, or to lose the paper, than are men. Finally, papers that
are refereed are shorter than those that are refused or lost.
Differences among journals are also evident from the means in
Appendix Table A2. Most interesting, except that G4 is out of
place, higher—quality journals use higher—quality referees.A
similar quality gradient exists with respect to the institutions
where the referees are employed. The Table also shows huge
differences among journals in some of the variables measuring
specific commitment: Journals G2, S2 and S3 rely very heavily on
their own authors, while G4 obtains much of the refereeing from
faculty employed around the editor's office. Other control
measures also differ significantly among journals, e.g., the length
of submissions to Sl and S2.
IV. The Effects of Quality and Commitment
Before testing the model's predictions about the determinants
of L, time spent in the queue, and p, the probability of
conclusions; but the issue is not unimportant generally, as there
are obvious analogies in other appointment-book problems.





Same School 0.130 0.053 0.118
Published in Journal 0.368 0.140 0.118
Foreign 0.037 0.035 0.059
Male 0.881 0.965 0.941
Top 20 0.301 0.368 0.471
Cartel 0.424 0.351 0.412
Other Academic 0.164 0.140 0.059
CITS1O—49 0.368 0.474 0.588
CITS5O 0.104 0.211 0.118
Continuous Variables:
Citations 20.94 29.97 19.71
(46.69) (35.56) (19.21)
Ph.D. Experience 16.24 18.28 14.47
(9.08) (8.87) (6.76)




Numberof 269 57 17
Observations
Standarddeviations in parentheses below the continuous variables.truncation from the queue, we need to show that the basic
assumption, .'(Z)>0,is correct for this sample. Direct evidence
on a sample of 41 economists in one department based on variables
like those in the data set supports this assumption. The following





where standard errors are in parentheses.The mean number of
articles refereed was five; the (two) heavily—cited faculty
refereed four times the department's average, while the (eleven)
well-cited faculty refereed two more articles than their typical
colleague.Perhaps most interesting, there is a significant
inverse quadratic in experience, with the peak refereeing at 16
years, not much different from the average experience in the sample
(14 years).
A. Effects on Truncation
The results on the effects of the quality and commitment
variables on are presented in Table 2, columns (1) and (2),
which show the parameters of a multinomial logit relating category
of response to the variables listed.Well- or heavily—cited
researchers are signifiàantly less likely to be doers, other things
equal.Additional estimates also included the vector of three
variables denoting the referee's affiliation. For none of them did
the absolute value of the t—statistic exceed .5.It is the
individual referee's achievements that affect p' and thus that












































































343 326signal quality to the customer. Once these are accounted for,
proxies for quality that are based on external factors have no
impact. While there is some evidence of the expected quadratic in
experience, with additional experience first reducing, then
increasing the probability that the job is done, neither term nor
the pair jointly is significantly different from zero.
The commitment measures generate fascinating results.
Measures of specific commitment sharply affect whether the task is
completed. Being at the same school as the editor has the expected
positive effect, and having published in the journal significantly
increases the likelihood that the task will be done.The two
measures of general commitment have insignificant effects on the
categorization (although women are somewhat more likely than men to
be doers).Finally, there is some evidence of the effect of
heterogeneity among customers. Papers that are longer are more
likely to be "lost," though length does not significantly affect
whether the task is done.
As shown earlier, there are substantial differences among
journals in many of the measures; but because none of the "only" 17
losers was at several of the journals, dummy variables for
individual journals could not be included in the multinomial logit.
The insignificance of the parameters distinguishing losers from
refusers suggests that for purposes of examining p' these
categories can be combined. Dummy variables for the journals are
included in simple probits describing whether the task is done (the
probability 1p).
15The results are presented in column (3) for the entire sample,
and in column (4) for doers and refusers only.They generally
corroborate the estimates of the multinomial logit. The magnitudes
of the specific commitment effects are substantial: Referees at
the same school as the editor are 12 percentage points more likely,
and those who have published in the journal are 11 percentage
points more likely than others to referee the paper.12(With a
mean of 1 —p=.78,these effects are very large.) The
commitment and quality measures are jointly significant against an
equation containing only journal dummy variables.
B. Effects on Waiting Time
Ordinary least squares estimation of the effects of the
commitment, quality and other variables on the refereeing lag is
the most familiar way to examine the effects on L*. These
estimates are presented in column (1) of Table 3 for the sample of
doers only. I do not discuss them here, mainly because they do not
reflect the analysis in Section II.In a queuing model the
interesting questions involve the determinants of waiting time and
survival. These are described by models of hazard rates, where the
hazard is h(t) =—dln(S(t)/dt,the escape rate from the queue
(containing at time t the fraction S(t) of the papers that arrived
12. An additional measure of specific commitment, whether the
referee was on the journal's editorial board, was also included in
some of the estimates. Its quantitative impact on the probability
of doing the task was tiny and insignificant, as was its effect in
the survival models estimated in the next Subsection. A similarly
small and insignificant impact is produced by an interaction term
that tests whether the effect of the editor being at the same
school is greater for younger referees.
16Table 3. The Determinants of L*(DoersOnly)
OLS Proportional Weibull
VARIABLE HazardsAccel. Failure
SaSe School 8.469 —0.253 —0.169
(8.53) (.201) (.135)
Published in 1.292 —0.078 —0.082
Journal (6.21) (.154) (.114)
Foreign 23.36 —0.527 —0.324
(14.63) (.349) (.328)
Male 1.168 —0.043 —0.063
(8.72) (.199) (.147)
CITS1O—49 5.634 —0.071 —0.051
(6.33) (.151) (.107)
CITS5O 15.77 —0.281 —0.269
(9.69) (.224) (.132)
Ph.D. Experience 0.64 —0.023 —0.017
(.92) (.021) (.016)
Ph.D. Experience2 —0.026 0.00093 0.00067
(.019) (.00045) (.00033)






or Log—Likelihood 0.111 —1220.8 —298.45
x215 47.05 43.18 42.24
x2(9) (against dummies) 16.46 19.40 27.50
Standard errors in parentheses. Dummyvariablesfor the journals
are included in all the estimates.
Evaluated at the means of the x.at time zero) .Inthis model the hazard rate can be used to infer
the waiting time until refereeing. It thus provides an empirical
approach that is based in queuing.13
The empirical survivor curve, the relation of S(t) to time
measured in weeks, is shown for the sample of doers by the U marks
in Figure 1 (leaving off weeks after 34, to which only five
referees "survive) .Itis noteworthy that the median waiting time
is only 6-1/2 weeks, while the seventy-fifth percentile is 11
weeks.14 Among the 78 percent who complete the task, the typical
referee does so in fairly short order. Figure 1 also graphs the
Kaplan—Meier estimates of the hazard rate (denoted by (+)).Itis
clear that the hazard is not monotonic. Instead, it is increasing
up to the point where half the sample of doers has exited, and
fluctuating around an essentially constant value thereafter.
The nonmonotonicity of the hazard rate and the absence of a
single peak suggest that any simple parametric specification of the
baseline hazard will be incorrect. I therefore estimate a
proportional hazards model. Column (2) of Table 3 shows estimates
of the parameter vector 1in:
5)h(t,x) =h(O,t)e
13.For a good discussion of hazard models, see Kiefer
(1988).These models have been used by economists mostly to
examine the duration of unemployment (most recently, Meyer, 1990)
Additional applications have been to strike duration (e.g.,
Lancaster, 1972) and to job tenure (Dolton, 1991).
14. Given lags in the mails, the actual time that the paper
spends in the referee's hands is probably one week less than the
Figure indicates.
17(/)
Figure 1. Survivor Function and Daily Hazard Rate, Doers
t (refereeing lag) in weeks
S(t) —÷-- h(t)where x is the vector of variables included as determinants of the
hazard rates. These estimates assume that each independent
variable has the same proportional effect on h regardless of the
duration in the queue. For any particular set of values of x the
hazard rate can vary freely. A negative coefficient implies that
increasing the particular variable reduces the hazard rate
(increases the waiting time).
Among the quality measures, the hazard rate is lower among
heavily—cited referees,and somewhat lower, though quite
insignificantly so, among well—cited referees. There is an
inverse—quadratic effect of experience on the hazard rate, with the
lowest hazard observed for referees with twelve years of experience
(somewhat below the sample mean for this variable) 15As the
theory predicted, 8L*/aZ > 0.
The negative coefficients on the two measures of specific
commitment contrast sharply to their effects on the refusal rate
and cannot be predicted by a simple queuing model. One way of
rationalizing them is to note that these commitment measures may
also proxy heterogeneity in service times: Where the referee has
published in the journal, or works with the editor, the paper may
receive more careful attention and thus generate a lower escape
rate. An alternative explanation is based on the possible
observability of L* (or at least of the response time to a specific
customer) and referees' response to it: By showing a willingness
15. A test of the joint significance of the two experience
variables yields x2(2) =7.00;X295(2) =5.99.Also, the variables
based on the referee's affiliation have no impact (x2(3) =2.2).
18to referee where specific commitment exists, but doing so without
undue alacrity, the referee slows the arrival rate from those
journals.
The general commitment variables also have negative effects on
waiting time.Conditional upon completing the task, there is
essentially no difference in the hazard between male and female
referees, while the hazard rate is lower among referees outside
North America. The difference may reflect lack of commitment to
the profession in its North American incarnation. Alternatively,
it may be the mechanical result of postal delays: The twenty-three
day difference implied by the OLS estimate is not far from the
round—trip time of an air—mail letter.16 The proportional hazards
model also indicates the importance of heterogeneity in the
refereeing queue: The hazard is lower for longer papers. Those
that require more service time take longer to move through the
queue.17
16.Another possible test of general commitment might be
constructed by comparing the coefficients of the dummy variables
for the S and G journals. Other things equal, one might expect
greater commitment to the field journals. With only seven journals
this is a rather stringent test; and the hazard rates are not
significantly lower at the general journals. However, the same
test on the coefficients of the dummy variables in the probits in
column (3) of Table 2 does suggest a slightly higher p among the
general journals.
17. Including losers as censored as of the date the paper was
recalled from them (as of the end of the sample period in some
cases) had only tiny effects on the .Similarlytiny changes were
produced if I treated all 17 losers as having refereed as of that
date, or if I viewed them as censored as of the longest duration
observed.Censoring may be nonrandom; and it clearly affects
parametric estimates of the hazard function. It does not, though,
influence the estimates of the impact of the quality and commitment
variables.
19The proportional hazards model is a relatively Unrestricted
way of examining the effects of x on the hazard rate of refereeing.
As a comparison to a more familiar form, though, column (3) of
Table 3 presents estimates of the vector f3 from a model in which
the baseline hazard is assumed to have a Weibull distribution. The
estimated in (3) are quite close to those of the proportional
hazards model and merit little comment. The baseline hazard
suggests that there is positive duration—dependence in refereeing:
As time passes, the probability that a referee will do the job,
conditional on eventually doing it, rises. Once losers are
included in the Weibull estimates, though, the positive duration—
dependence is not significant. This suggests, and formal tests
verify, that the Weibull distribution does not provide a
satisfactory fit to this hazard. As Figure 1 shows, there is no
uniform duration dependence in this process; indeed, it is not
described well by any standard distribution.18
A final econometric issue is whether the variables in x
capture referee—specific heterogeneity.If we had two or more
observations on each referee, or on many of the referees, we could
estimate the hazard function using individual effects. We cannot
do that satisfactorily here; nor could the kind of random sampling
18. The Kolmogorov—Smirnov statistic for this
parameterization was 1.31, just above the 99—percent critical level
for a Weibull distribution with unknown parameters (D'Agostino and
Stephens, 1986, p. 147). A Gompertz distribution, a normal and a
logistic were also estimated. The first two fit much worse than
the Weibull distribution, while for the latter the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic had the same significance as that from the
Weibull.
20that is crucial to this project generate such data. Fifteen
referees are, though, included twice in the sample of doers, and
one is included three times. A vector of dummy variables for these
people was included in reestimates of column (1), with a resulting
F(l5, 238) =.87,insignificantly different from zero at any
conventional level. This admittedly very partial evidence suggests
that this kind of heterogeneity among suppliers is not a problem in
this sample.
One interpretation of the estimates of ap/az and 3L'/äz is
that they reflect referees trying to ingratiate themselves with
editors by doing the task promptly as an investment in their
careers. If so, L* and p would increase steadily, though perhaps
nonlinearly, with experience. That the quadratics in experience in
both Tables 2 and 3 have extrema near the sample mean of X suggests
this explanation is incorrect.Another interpretation is based
upon sample selection.If editors learn which referees respond
slowly (or refuse) and do not request their services, the fraction
of rapid respondents among referees included in the samplewould
increase with experience.That we observe the probability and
speed of response falling over the first half of the distribution
of referee's experience implies that this interpretation is also
wrong.
A more subtle and more serious potential problem arises from
the possibility that referees' quality reflects the heterogeneity
of customers because editors match papers that require more effort
with higher-quality referees. There is no way of examining this
21effect in these data. However, I obtained another set of data from
journal Gl, a listing of all the referee—author matches over a
roughly one—month period in 1991. A contingency table showing the
citation counts for 1990 on each of the 129 matches (of 80 separate
submissions to the journal) is presented in Table 4.
These data show that the referees are far more widely—cited
than authors. Moreover, X2—tests over the entire Table reject the
hypothesis that the author—referee matches are random. The
rejection, though, is based solely on the very few extremely
heavily—cited (more than 100 citations per year) authors. When
these 6 matches are deleted, the matching process appears random.
Whether the same conclusion would hold if data were available from
other journals is unclear. But the higher quality of referees at
Gl than at the other journals suggests the scope for matching
elsewhere is less than at Gl. If other editors behave as at Gi,
matching is even less important than the data in Table 4 indicate.
Heterogeneity in matching does not seem to be important, at least
along this dimension.
V. Queue Discipline, and the Price of Quality
A. Monetary Bribes to Change Suppliers' Behavior
Because one of the seven journals offers prompt referees a
small monetary incentive, we can infer the relative effect of
monetary incentives on waiting time.(Payments of this sort are
offered by no more than ten percent of professional journals in
economics.) The journal (Gi) pays for completion within a nominal
220—4 21 3 37 12 6 79
5—9 2 3 4 4 2 15
10—49 3 2 14 4 2 25
50—99 2 0 1 1 0 4
100+ 0 1 0 2 3 6
28 9 56 23 13 129
x2-statistics
=17.58;all observations, categories 0—4, 5—9, 10—49,
50+; p =.04.
x2(4) =8.32;all observations, categories 0—9, 10—49, 50+;
p =.08.
z2(4)=2.47;excludes 6 matches on authors with CITES ￿ 100;
p >.10.
x2(2) =1.49;excludes 10 matches on authors with CITES ￿ So;
p >.10.
Table 4. Author-Referee Matches by Citation Count
Referee






4.one month (in actuality, if the completed report is received at the
editorial office within six weeks of the date it was sent out) •19
If the discussion in Section II is correct, we should expect
the prospective payment to have its biggest effect on queue
discipline at the margin. That is, if the queue is very long, so
that t1 >> 42 days(six weeks), the incentive should be
unimportant. In that case either t ￿ t', so that the request is
truncated from the queue; or the paper remains in its place in the
queue. Obversely, if the queue is so short that the paper will be
refereed almost immediately anyway, the incentive will also be
unimportant. Only if the queue is such that the paper is on the
margin of being eligible to qualify the referee for payment will
the bribe induce a change in queue discipline.
Figure 2 shows Kaplan-Neier estimates of the daily hazard
rates for Gl, and for the aggregate of the other six journals, for
completion in 0—14 days, 15—28 days, etc., through 85—98 days.2°
(With only three manuscripts outstanding at journal Gi, the hazard
beyond 98 days is uninteresting.) Remarkably, the hazard rates are
nearly identical in the first two-week interval, and essentially
the same in all three biweekly intervals containing weeks 9 through
19.Based on conversation with the editor and editorial
assistant, December 28, 1990. A small survey of economists
suggests that the median time spent refereeing is such that the
hourly payment offered by Gl is only slightly above the minimum
wage rate in the United States.
20. The hazards for the other six journals in Figure 2 are
based on a sample that includes losers as censored observations.







Figure2Hazard Rates at Journals Gl and Others
8 10 12
t (refereeing lag) in weeks14.The hazard rate at Gl is higher in the second and third
biweekly intervals (days 15-42) and lower in the fourth interval
(days 43—56) .Moreover,these three hazards, and only these, are
more than one standard deviation apart, even with the very small
sample size at Gl.2 Paying to induce queue—jumping shifts
customers (refereeing tasks) just far enough ahead in the queue to
qualify the supplier (referee) for the bribe (honorarium).
The comparisons in Figure 2 do not account for the higher
quality of referees used by journal Gl than by other journals.
Holding quality (and the other variables included in Table 3)
constant, the hazard rate at Gl is higher than at every other
journal. The effect is not small: Compared to the average of
other journals, conditional upon submitting a report the same
referee responds two weeks more quickly to Gi.
Figure 2 reflects the gross effects of bribing referees.
Presumably speed increases partly because referees increase L and
p in their other (unpaid) refereeing tasks, partly because they
increase joverall.If all journals paid referees, only this
latter, probably small scale effect would be generated.Each
journal wishing to bribe referees confronts the problem of setting
optimal prices in the face of unknown responses by suppliers of
refereeing services to its own and others' prices. The minimal
21. That the effect works by shifting the hazard around a
margin is analogous to Kennan's (1980) results on the effects of
paying unemployment insurance benefits to strikers after the strike
has lasted for some length of time, and to changes in hazard rates
out of unemployment around the time benefits are exhausted (e.g.,
Meyer, 1990)
24reliance on such bribes thus far means that we are far from being
able to infer these optimal prices.
B. The Market for Quality Refereeing
Assume that the quality of each referee is known to the
customer—editor who assigns papers for refereeing, and that the
editor seeks to obtain a high-quality, timely evaluation of the
paper. This may result from a desire to produce a high-quality
journal of current interest as well as from the editors role as an
agent for gathering information for authors.Assume that the
information contained in the proxies for quality, Z, is the same as
that available to editors. Then we can interpret the effect of an
increase in the value of one of these proxies as the price of
quality in this implicit market.
To derive the implicit price, ask the question: What is the
total effect of an increase in quality on the probability
distribution of time until service (by all suppliers, not just the
first referee to whom the paper is sent)? This distribution is
affected both by changes in waiting time and by changes in refusal
and loss rates, i.e., by aL*/aZ and by ap/3Z. I use the estimates
of the multinomial logit in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, and of
the accelerated failure time model in column (3) of Table 3, to
infer these derivatives. (For all but the citations and experience
measures the variables in x are held constant at their means.) I
assume that a paper that is returned by a refuser is sent out for
a second time 5 weeks after the first time (2 weeks in the
editorial office plus the 3—week mean time until refusal). Each
25paper handled by a loser is sent to a new referee after 37 weeks (2
weeks in the editorial office plus the 35—week mean time until the
paper is viewed as lost)
Table 5 presents statistics describing the distribution of
completed service times until an editor receives one report.
Column (1) lists means and order statistics for the distribution
when the mean values of all variables are used. It shows that one
report can be obtained on the median paper in less than two months;
and for only ten percent of articles does it take longer than four
months to obtain a report.22 The long upper tail of the
distribution of waiting times is generated by the (small)
probability that the paper is sent to a loser.
The remaining columns in the Table evaluate the distributions
by comparing little- to heavily—cited referees, and fresh Ph.D.s
(experience of zero) to those with fifteen years of experience (for
whom the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 showed that L* and p* were
around the highest in the sample). Consider columns (2) and (3),
where only the referee's citations vary. Reliance on heavily—cited
referees increases the mean time until completion by 3 weeks. If
we add differences in experience (as in the comparison between
columns (4) and (5)), the implicit price of quality is a difference
in mean waiting times of 3—1/2 weeks.
Accounting for a one—week round—trip by mail, the difference
between columns (4) and (5) implies that a policy of using highest-
22. If we assume that editors seek two reports ab initio, the
median waiting time to receive both reports rises only to 80 days,
and the ninetieth percentile rises to 6.5 months.
26Table 5. Distributions of Times to Obtain One Referee's Report (in
Days)
CH?RACTERISTIC8
Means CITS <10CITS >49CITS <10CITS >49
X=0 X=15
PERCENTILE
10 15 14 22 13 24
25 31 27 43 25 45
50 55 50 72 46 76
75 86 79 107 76 116
90 128 115 153 124 166
95 234 163 195 288 226
MEAN 75 68 89 71 95
Probability
of:
Doer 0.784 0.854 0.652 0.883 0.644
Refuser 0.166 0.104 0.317 0.044 0.316
Loser 0.050 0.042 0.031 0.073 0.040instead of lowest-quality referees requires the payment of 38
percent in additional time costs. This is an unbiased measure of
the price of quality in this implicit market. If we assume that
the market is in equilibrium, and assume too that editors are
rational, we must conclude that this additional time cost is offset
by the better refereeing job done by higher-quality referees. The
additional lag is the price editors pay for obtaining better
reports 23
VI.Truncating the Queuein Medical Practice
Toexamine whether the predictions of the theory of
appointment books carry over into an entirely different endeavor,
I obtained data describing physicians in private practice who
participate in a prepaid health plan in a midwestern metropolitan
area. The data describe only truncation, in particular, whether
the physician was not taking new patients at the time the plan
published its annual directory of participating members.
There are 321 primary-care physicians in the plan (family
practitioners, internists, obstetrician—gynecologists, and
pediatricians).Complete information was obtained on 264 (82
percent) •whoform the sample used in this Section. The measure of
quality is experience, years since licensed in the state,
23.Of course, much of the burden of the lag is borne by
authors, not by editors. Editors may know they face this trade—off
and do so willingly. It is hard to believe that authors have such
knowledge, though they may have information about the average
quality of referees at different journals and the average
refereeing lags. One might, though, view editors as the authors'
agents in obtaining comments from the profession in a way that
maximizes authors' utility.
27essentially a measure of when the physician began practice.24
Since I do not observe who the potential patients are, I cannot
construct variables to distinguish between the effects of specific
and general commitment.Instead, all of the other variables
M.D. compared to osteopath, family practitioner or internist
compared to others, female or male, outside or inside the central
part of the metropolitan area, and practicing at least part—time at
the local university medical school —-—canbe interpreted either
way.Also, some may be viewed as reflecting differences among
groups of physicians in arrival rates.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 show the means of the variables.
The mean of p is about 20 percent, but is nearly 30 percent for
MDs alone. The average physician has been practicing around 16
years, but the range of experience is between 0 and 50 years. The
large majority of physicians are men, are not affiliated with the
university medical school, and are located in the central cities or
their adjacent suburbs.
The main results of this Section are contained in the probits
describing p, the probability that the physician is not taking new
patients. Consider the estimates of the impact of experience on
this probability, shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6. As a pair
the coefficients on X and X2 are jointly significant in the entire
sample and especially among MOs alone. (Adding higher—order terms
in X does not change the conclusion that p eventually decreases
24. The data are from American Medical Association Directory,
32nd edition, Chicago, 1990, and American Osteopathic Association,
Yearbook and Directory of Osteopathic Physicians, Chicago, 1990.




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Family Practice.77 1.16 .73 1.23
or Internist (.30) (.33)
In Town .73 .36 .76 .69
(.26) (.31)
At University .22 .55 .19 .94
(.25) (.30)
Female .19 .59 .17 .64
(.27) (.33)
Experience 16.21 .0945 17.14 .1274
(.045) (.055)
Experience2 ———. 00158 ——-.00202
(.00098) (.00115)





standard errors in parentheses. Each equation also contains a
constant.with additional experience.)In the entire sample and among MDs
alone 16 percent of the physicians are on the decreasing part of
the truncation—experience relationship. The inverse U—shaped
relationship is consistent with the view that experience is a proxy
for qi.iality that determines the arrival rate of customers to
suppliers who are committed to offering a service without making
customers remain in line too long.It is inconsistent with an
interpretation that physicians build up a practice, begin turning
away patients once they reach a full load that they somehow define,
and continue to do so to allow their clientele to diminish so that
they can reduce their labor supply as they near retirement.
Several of the control variables have significant impacts in
ways that are consistent with arguments based on specific
commitment (but also with heterogeneity in customers demand).
That in-town physicians and those associated with the medical
school are more likely to truncate their queues may reflect their
lesser likelihood of encountering their potential patients outside
their practices. The greater probabilities of truncation by family
practitioners and internists and by MD5 are consistent with tighter
markets for their services (and also with lower turnover of their
patients). Greater truncation by female physicians may reflect
their desire to allocate time to household production.25
Clearly, the results in this Section are not by themselves
convincing evidence of the importance of appointment—book markets.
25. The higher truncation rate by female doctors is
independent of specialty. Also, using separate dummy variables for
all four specialties does not alter any of the results.
29They do, though, corroborate the evidence from refereeing that the
effect of quality on the arrival rate of customers combines with
suppliers' commitment to generate differences in truncation rates.
Moreover, because there is no intermediary who might match more
difficult cases with higher—quality suppliers (these are all
primary—care physicians), there is even less possibility that the
matching of customers and suppliers is generating the results in
this example than in the sample of referees.
VII. Conclusions, and Other Applications
I have pointed out the existence of what I have called
appointment—book markets. In them suppliers choose their
customers' waiting times and deny some customers entrance to the
queue for services. The latter choice arises because the customers
cannot obtain information about waiting times, and thus cannot make
the utility—maximizing choices that the suppliers, who are
generally committed to them, make on their behalf.The model
predicts that higher—quality suppliers will exhibit longer waiting
times and will be more likely to deny customers entry to the queue.
They are less likely to deny entry to those customers with whom
past contact has created specific commitment, and they will also
serve those customers faster.
I examined this model using a unique set of data describing
the behavior of referees for economics journals. Several measures
of quality are positively correlated with the probability of
denying entry to the queue (refusing to referee) and with waiting
time (the lag in refereeing an article).Measures of specific
30commitment ———recentpublication in the journal and location at
theinstitutionthat houses the editorial office ---havethe
predicted negative effects on the refusal to referee, but have no
effect on waiting time.This latter result cannot be explained
within a simple queuing model. The results on the probability of
denying entry to the queue are verified on a sample of physicians.
Consider first a specific normative implication of the
empirical results on refereeing. They suggest that most referees
are remarkably prompt, and that lags in the process result mainly
from delays generated by a small percentage of referees whom I have
called losers. Half (two-thirds) of the papers held longer than
four (six) months have been sent to losers.To speed up the
process with only a small loss in quality, journal editors might
consider automatically truncating the long thin tail of waiting
times by assuming that any referee who holds a paper for four (or
six) months is a loser and sending the paper to another referee.
Authors' welfare would be increased by the elimination of the low-
probability, high—loss event of a very long wait; and editorial
offices would obviate the serious headaches of dealing with losers.
More important than guidelines for scholarly publishing are
the general implications of the appointment-book problem and the
subtler issues of suppliers' behavior. Perhaps chief among these
is the question of what generates general commitment ——-whydo
suppliers truncate a queue that customers cannot see? Some
impressionistic evidence that this is explained by businesses'
desires to invest in long—term relations with customers is the
31failure to truncate queues for admission to certain tourist
attractions. For examples, at Disneyland and at the Empire State
Building, waiting occurs at a separate location from where tickets
are purchased, thare is no truncation, and the probability of a
long—ten relationship between customer and supplier is low. The
same behavior may characterize how employers handle job
applications:To what extent do employers bother notifying
unsuccessful applicants that jobs have been filled? Further
examination of this issue is crucial.
Another issue worth studying is whether welfare maxima are
reached in these markets.For example, instead of truncating,
suppliers could simply announce the queue length and let customers
ration the service by the value of their waiting times. Do
transactions costs prevent this; or is the failure due to the
monopolists' desires to control access to the service and offer
favors to those customers to whom they are specifically committed?
comparisons of differences in rationing schemes that suppliers
impose in response to different technical conditions could answer
these questions.These in turn lead to studying how market
structure affects waiting times and trunction, and whether
suppliers invest in technical improvements that might enable
customers to ration the service themselves.26
26. Some evidence against the monopoly argument is provided
by the example of the Australian National Roads and Motorists'
Association, whose automated phone—answering system announces the
current response time to callers who are put on hold. The
institution of automated branched phone—response systems is an
example of a technical improvement designed to overcome the
appointment-book problem.
32Consumers' inability to see the full price of a service
because they cannot discover its time price generates unusual
behavior by suppliers.It allows them more discretion than in
markets with only money prices, or with visible time prices, in
that they can discriminate among customers. It also, though, may
encourage them to turn away customers even though that may not be
short—run profit-maximizing. It may not even be long—run prof it-
maximizing if their actions are affected by a general feeling of
commitment to potential customers.
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35Appendix Table Al. Questionnaire for the Study of Refereeing Lags
DATE PAPER BENT TO REFEREE: MONTE _________ DAY
LENGTH OF PAPER (total pages):_______________
REFEREE'SNAME: ____________________________________________
REFEREE' B AFFILIATION: _________________________________________
DATE PAPER RECEIVED BACK
FROMREFEREE: MONTM ______________DAY__________
TEEREFEREE: DID: _______DIDNOT: _______SUBMITA REPORTAppendix Table A2. Means of Variables, by Journal*
JOURNAL DESIGNATION
VARIABLE
Gi G2 G3 G4 81 82 83
Same SChool 0.042 0.1430.0420.3060.1220.1400.020
(.067) (.163) (.053) (.379) (.135)(.163) (.020)
Published in 0.2500.490 0.271 0.061 0.1840.4200.540
Journal (.333) (.488) (.316) (.069)(.189)(.465) (.551)
Foreign 0.083 0.082 00.0200.0610.020 0
(.100) (.070) (0)(.035) (.054) (.023) (0)
Male 0.9380.9390.8960.9390.8160.8200.940
(.90)(.930) (.895) (.966)(.757)(.791) (.939)
Pop 20 0.5620.2860.0620.1840.5100.4000.240
(.533) (.256)(.053)(.138) (.514) (.419) (.224)
Cartel 0.2710.4490.4790.6330.3060.3400.400
(.333) (.465)(.500)(.759) (.297) (.279) (.408)
Other 0.0620.1220.2920.1020.1430.2000.160
Academic (.033)(.140)(.289) (.103) (.135) (.233) (.163)
CITS1O—49 0.5000.429 0.208 0.449 0.3670.3400.480
(.500) (.419) (.184) (.448) (.297) (.279) (.469)
CITS5O 0.292 0.122 0.021 0.143 0.122 0.1000.060
(.200) (.116) (.026) (.138) (.108) (.116) (.061)
Citations 43.79 24.657.08 224728.1815.3215.56
(39.67) (24.79) (6.89) (22.24) (28.46) (15.40) (15.41)
Ph.D. 18.54 14.74 15.7718.1610.3719.8018.00
Experience (16.33) (14.56) (15.45) (19.83) (9.27) (19.91) (18.20)
Pages 27.58 25.4522.2922.2633.4332.7823.26
(25.43) (25.26) (21.97) (22.00) (32.73) (33.28) (23.20)
Days (45.37) (56.02) (50.10) (56.76) (90.60) (49.30) (40.76)
48 49 48 49 49 50 50
(30) (43) (38) (29) (37) (43) (49)
AMeans in parentheses are for doers only; others describe the
ntire sample.